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DOES THE CHINESE INTEREST RATE 





One argument for floating the Chinese renminbi (RMB) is to insulate China’s monetary 
policy from the US effect. However, we note that both theoretical considerations and 
empirical results do not offer a definite answer on the link between exchange rate 
arrangement and policy dependence. We examine the empirical relevance of the argument by 
analyzing the interactions between the Chinese and US interest rates. Our empirical results, 
which appear robust to various assumptions of data persistence, suggest that the US effect on 
the Chinese interest rate is quite weak. Apparently, even with its de facto peg to the US dollar, 
China has alternative measures to retain its policy independence and de-link its interest rates 
from the US rate. In other words, the argument for a flexible RMB to insulate China’s 
monetary policy from the US effect is not substantiated by the observed interest rate 
interactions. 
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1. Introduction 
Building upon its successful economic story in the last two decades, China has entered 
the new millennium with rapid export growth and continuing penetration into the global market. 
With its increasing influences, China’s economic policy is under close scrutiny by the 
international community. One topic that has attracted much attention is China’s exchange rate 
policy. Since 1994, China has adopted a de facto peg to the US dollar. In the aftermath of the 
1997 financial crisis, the fixed rate policy was praised for its role in stabilizing the regional and 
world economy. In the recent years, however, the same de facto fixed exchange rate policy has 
become the centre of a contentious controversy. Specifically, some countries, among which the 
US is the most vocal one, accuse China of gaining unfair advantages by maintaining an 
undervalued renminbi (RMB) and, as a result, running a huge trade surplus and exacerbating 
global imbalances, which can destabilize the global economic system.
1 
To resolve the global imbalance problem, some countries, economists, and commentators 
urge China to adopt a flexible exchange rate policy and allow the RMB to appreciate. In fact, on 
July 21
st, 2005 China re-valued its currency and announced the policy of pegging to a basket of 
currencies. Even though the move was warmly, albeit cautiously, welcomed, it does not soften 
the international demand for further RMB flexibility. Indeed, the behaviour of the RMB after 
July 2005 is akin to a peg to the US dollar more than to a basket of diversified currencies. 
There is no shortage of proposals in both the media and academia for China to reform its 
foreign exchange market and policy stance.
2  One argument offered by advocates of a flexible 
RMB is that it is to China’s benefit to float its currency. It is based on the merits of exchange rate 
flexibility presented in the long-standing debate of exchange rate regime choices.
3  With a (de 
facto) fixed exchange rate, China has to give up monetary policy independence and follow the 
policy set by the US, which is the anchor currency country in order to maintain the pegged 
                                                 
1    The estimated degree of RMB undervaluation varies with the model under consideration. 
Cheung, Chinn and Fujii (2005), however, point out that there is a high degree of uncertainty 
surrounding the estimated degree of undervaluation. 
2    Some more recent examples are Eichengreen (2006), Goldstein (2004), Goodfriend and 
Prasad (2006), Roberts and Tyers (2003), and Williamson (2005). McKinnon (2005, 2006) and 
Mundell (2004) are among the few that favor RMB stability. McCallum (2004) and Schwartz 
(2005) represent yet another view on the issue: China, and not outside sovereignties, should 
determine the complex issue of reforming its foreign exchange policy.   
3    Friedman (1953) presents some classic arguments for exchange rate flexibility.   2
exchange rate. Despite its increasing integration into the world economy, there is no apparent 
evidence that China and the US share common business cycles. In the absence of similar cyclical 
behaviour, it is very costly for China to follow the US monetary policy.   
On the other hand, a flexible currency will isolate China from external shocks and, thus, 
allow China to pursue an independent monetary policy to address its own domestic economic 
issues. Thus, China stands to gain policy autonomy and the associated economic benefits by 
improving its exchange rate flexibility.   
The relevance of the argument is, nonetheless, not beyond doubt. A natural question to 
ask is: Does exchange rate flexibility allow China to pursue an independent monetary policy? 
It is well known that the insulation property of a flexible exchange rate system can be 
imperfect.
4  In an extreme theoretical setting, a fixed exchange rate arrangement implies 
complete monetary policy dependence, which, in the current content, means that there is a one 
for one pass through of the US interest rate to the Chinese domestic interest rate.
5 The  actual 
degree of pass through can be hampered by capital controls and sterilization operations. The link 
between exchange rate regimes and interest rate pass through is further complicated by the “fear 
of floating” phenomenon – a situation in which countries adopt a de jure flexible system and, at 
the same time, restrict the variability of their exchange rates and, thus, limit the effectiveness of 
exchange rate insulation property.
6 
Besides the “fear of floating,” there are other reasons that countries with floating rates 
behave like those with exchange rates pegged to the US. For instance, countries with a 
substantial trade relationship with the US may find it beneficial to follow the US lead. Further, 
countries can take the US monetary policy as an important input to their own policy making 
process if they perceive the US has a good gauge of the economic conditions and an adept 
monetary policy decision process. The observed monetary policy dependence can go beyond the 
                                                 
4    See, for example, Corden (1985), Devereux and Engel (1999), Mussa (1979), and Salant 
(1977). 
5    To be sure, interest rate interactions are one of the ways to infer monetary policy 
dependence. Linkages induced by a fixed exchange rate arrangement can also be gauged by, say, 
interactions between inflation (Cheung and Yuen, 2002; Ghosh et al., 1997; Quirk, 1994). Bergin 
and Jordà (2004), for example, use central bank issued policy rate targets to measure monetary 
policy interdependence. 
6    See Calvo and Reinhart (2000) and Hausmann et al. (2001) for an explication of the “fear of 
floating” phenomenon. Dooley et al. (2003) assert the peg to the US dollar is part of the 
export-led development policy pursued by these economies.   3
extent implied by exchange rate arrangements. 
The extant empirical evidence on the effect of fixing exchange rates on monetary policy 
dependence is mixed. Some recent studies including Borensztein et al. (2001) and Shambaugh 
(2004) find that pegged countries tend to follow their anchor currency country’s interest rates 
more than the non-pegged ones and, thus, suggest that exchange rate flexibility enhances 
monetary policy independence. On the other hand, Frankel (1999), Frankel et al. (2004), and 
Hausmann et al. (1999) find no substantial evidence of exchange-rate-regime effects on 
monetary policy dependence – the interest rate pass through behaviour is similar across countries 
with different exchange rate regime choices.
7 
Apparently, both theoretical and empirical results are ambivalent on the issue. There is 
not a definite verdict that the prescription of RMB flexibility will give China an independent 
monetary policy. 
Without the benefit of foresight, we turn our attention to a related question: Has China 
lost its policy independence and is the Chinese interest rate following the US interest rate under 
the current de facto pegged exchange rate arrangement? Apparently, this question has received 
less discussion in the debate on RMB policy. If the current Chinese interest rate is not driven by 
the US rate and if the Chinese economy is performing reasonably well, then abandoning the peg 
for policy independence may not be a relevant argument. Even a causal observer will not rule out 
the possibility of imperfect interest rate pass through when one takes into consideration the 
effects of capital restrictions (even though China’s capital account is perceived porous), 
sterilization, and other possible policy measures.   
To shed some insights on China’s dependence on the US monetary policy, we follow, for 
example, Frankel et al. (2004) and Shambaugh (2004) and infer policy dependence based on 
interest rate interactions between these two countries.
8  Specifically, we consider data on the 
Chinese one-month interbank interest rates and US one-month Fed fund interest rates.   
We anticipate the empirical study of interest rate interactions has to overcome the 
uncertainty about data persistence. In general, interest rates are bounded and do not fit the 
                                                 
7   Frankel  et al. (2004) also reported that a floating regime offers “temporary monetary 
independence” in the sense that the interest rate adjustment speed is lower under a floating 
regime than under a fixed regime.   
8    Chinn and Frankel (1995) employ real interest rates to assess the impacts of US and 
Japanese policies on Pacific Rim economies.   4
description of a nonstationary I(1) process. In most empirical exercises, however, it is difficult to 
reject the I(1) hypothesis for data on interest rates. To ensure that our inferences are robust to the 
assumption of data persistence, we employ different empirical techniques that allow us to handle 
various possible scenarios. The empirical strategy will be discussed in the subsequent sections.         
 
2. Data  Description 
As mentioned earlier, one-month Chinese interbank interest rates and one-month US Fed 
fund interest rates are used to infer the pattern of interest rate pass through.
9 Arguably,  there  is 
little doubt that the US Fed fund interest rate movements are market driven and reflect policy 
intentions. The Chinese interest rate, one the other hand, may not be as well understood as the 
US one. Thus, we provide a brief background description of the Chinese interbank market. 
The interbank market is one component of the growing Chinese money market.
10 In  the 
early 1980s, it was an informal market for township and village enterprises. In 1985, the market 
got official endorsement and stated-owned specialized banks were allowed to participate in the 
lending and borrowing activities. The major change came in January 1996. At that time, China 
revamped the interbank market and instituted a unified interbank trading mechanism that 
responds to demand and supply conditions. Indeed, it is perceived that the interbank market is an 
efficient segment of the Chinese money market and, say, the one-month interbank rate is 
representative of other short-term interest rates and is an indicator of the Chinese monetary 
policy.
11  
To facilitate interpretation, we also examine the dependence of the Hong Kong 
one-month interbank interest rate on the US rate. The choice of Hong Kong is driven by a few 
considerations. First, the theoretical insulation property of the exchange rate arrangement can be 
illustrated quite clearly within the framework of a small open economy without capital controls. 
                                                 
9    The official rates set by the Fed and the People’s Bank of China are not used because these 
rates change only infrequently and, thus, are deemed not suitable for the statistical analysis 
adopted in the current study. 
10    The other main components are the interbank bond market and the bond repo market. The 
description of the Chinese interbank market is mainly drawn from Imam (2004), Li and Peng 
(2002), and Xie (2002).   
11    The interbank lending rate ceiling was abolished. Foreign licensed banks were allowed to 
borrow RMB in the interbank market after May 1998. See Imam (2004), Li and Peng (2002), and 
Xie (2002) for a more detailed discussion.     5
The academic description of a small open economy without capital controls, however, represents 
some stringent conditions in reality. Hong Kong is a small open economy that is renowned for its 
laissez-faire policy, minimum government intervention, and free capital mobility. Arguably, 
Hong Kong is one of the few economies that has attributes very close to the theoretical 
description of a small open economy without capital controls. Thus, Hong Kong is a good 
reference point in evaluating exchange rate regime effects. 
Second, Hong Kong has a de facto fixed exchange rate against the US dollar since 
adopting a currency board system in 1983. During the sample period under consideration, both 
Hong Kong and China follow a similar de facto exchange rate arrangement.   
Third, Hong Kong has significant linkages with China – at least, geographically and 
economically. The close tie between these two economies helps compare the responses of their 
interest rates to the US interest rate. In sum, these features make Hong Kong a good benchmark 
for evaluating the interest rate interacts between China and the US. 
In view of the development of the Chinese interbank market, we consider the sample 
period from February 1996 to April 2006. The monthly data were retrieved from Bloomberg L.P. 
and CEIC. Graphs of the one-month and official discount rates are plotted in Figure 1 to Figure 
3. Figure 4 contains the official rates from the three economies. 
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Two observations are apparent from these graphs. First, the three one-month interest rates 
in general move around their respective official rates and track their movements quite well. Thus, 
these market interest rates reflect the policy intentions and are suitable for studying interest rate 
dependence among these economies.   
Second, the Hong Kong and US official rates appear to move in tandem, as expected. 
During the sample period, Hong Kong had a currency board arrangement. As a small open 
economy with almost no capital controls, Hong Kong is expected to have its interest rates follow 
the interest rates of its reserve currency – in this case the US dollar interest rates. While their 
official rates move in lockstep, the Hong Kong and the US market interest rates diverged a few 
times during the 1997 Asian financial crisis and in 1998 when the interest rate policy was used to 
defend the currency board arrangement. Around 2004, the Hong Kong interest rate moved away 
from the US interest rate for a different reason. During that time, because of the expectations of 
its currency’s revaluation, Hong Kong experienced a large influx of hot money that kept its 
interbank interest rates lower than the US rates.
12  
The Chinese and US interest rates, on the other hands, display no obvious similarities. 
Thus, despite China has a de facto peg, the Chinese interest rate does not vary along with the US 
                                                 
12  To be exact, the market expected an imminent RMB evaluation and that the HK dollar will 
follow the RMB move.   8
one. Formal statistical evidence on the dependence between these interest rate data is presented 
in the following sections. 
 
3. Preliminary  Analyses 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is employed to assess the persistence of interest 
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where Yit is the generic notation of economy i’s interest rate at time t for i = China, Hong Kong, 
and the US.  Δ  is the differencing operation. Under the unit-root null hypothesis,  0 = i δ . 
Equation (1) includes both a constant and a time trend. The trend term is included to 
ensure the test result does not depend on the value of  i ω   (Evans and Savin, 1984). West (1987) 
also points out that the ADF test is inconsistent if the process is stationary around a time trend 
and the trend term is not included. The inclusion of an irrelevant trend term, on the other hand, 
will lower the power of the test. In fact, for the interest rates under consideration, the trend term 
is only significant in a few instances. However, as a safeguard against misleading inferences, we 
choose to keep the trend term in the regression and accept a power loss. For completeness, we 
reported test results based on (1) with and without the trend term. 
The ADF test results from the whole sample and two non-overlapping subsamples 
(1996-2000 and 2000-2006) are presented in Table 1. The lag parameter was chosen to eliminate 
serial correlation in the estimated residuals. The choice of the two subsamples allows us to 
examine whether interest rate interactions before and after the crisis are similar.
13 The  results  in 
Table 1 do not present unambiguous evidence on interest rate persistence. While the two ADF 
tests do not offer strong evidence against the unit root hypothesis for the entire sample, they give 
mixed results in the subsamples. Specifically, the Hong Kong and US interest rate data reject the 
unit root hypothesis in the 1996-2000 subsample but not in the second subsample. The results for 
the Chinese data are comparable to the other two economies but the evidence of stationarity in 
the first subsample is weaker than the evidence for the other two economies. 
One can speculate that the interest rates follow a stationary process in the first subsample 
and a unit root process in the second subsample period. The whole period results are driven by 
                                                 
13    We take both the 1997 and 1998 crises into consideration.   9
the 2000 to 2006 data. However, such an interpretation may not be correct. For instance, during 
the first subsample, the extraordinary economic events including the crises may have masked the 
true underlying interest rate dynamics. 
 
Table 1.  Unit Root Test Results 
 
1996:2 – 2006:4    1996:2 – 2000:6    2000:7 – 2006:4 
 Constant  Constant  + 
Trend 
 Constant  Constant  + 
Trend 
 Constant  Constant  + 
Trend 
A. China               
ADF -2.830**  -1.091    0.326  -5.212*    -1.489  -2.108 
Lag 2  2   2  0   1  1 
B. Hong Kong               
ADF -1.229  -1.496    -3.479  *  -3.438**   -2.257  -0.430 
Lag 7  7   0  0   7  1 
C. US               
ADF  -1.911  -2.114   -4.708*  -3.676*   -3.009*  -1.071 
Lag 12  12   12  12    4  1 
 
Note:   The table reports results of applying the ADF tests to the Chinese, Hong Kong, and the 
US interest rates in Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C. The first row lists the time periods 
covered by the full sample, the first subsample, and the second subsample. “ADF” gives 
the ADF test statistics. “LAG” gives the lag parameters used in the test procedures. “*” 
and “**” indicate the rejection of the unit root null hypothesis at the 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. The Cheung and Lai (1995) finite sample critical values are used. In all 
cases, the Box-Ljung Q-statistics calculated from the first 5 and 10 estimated residual 
autocorrelations are not significant. 
 
The unit root test is notorious for its inability to offer a sharp inference to differentiate a 
unit root process from a persistent but stationary one. Thus, instead of forcing a definite 
inference, we opted to examine evidence under both stationary and unit-root specifications for 
interest rate data. Such an approach will alleviate the possibility that the empirical interest rate 
interactions are driven by the stationarity assumption.   10
 
4.  Interest Rate Dependence 
The proper choice of a statistical technique to investigate interest rate interactions 
crucially depends on the presence or absence of a unit root in the data. For instance, if the data 
contain unit roots, then a cointegration rather than a vector autoregression setup should be used. 
Unfortunately, the unit root test results do not provide an incisive inference. In view of the 
ambivalence, a few approaches are considered to cover various possible scenarios. Thus, instead 
of betting on a specific technique, we contemplate evidence derived from procedures that may 
provide the correct inferences. 
 
4.1 Cointegration 
First, we assume the interest rate data have a unit root and the cointegration framework is 
adopted to investigate the empirical long-run and short-term interactions. Specifically, the 
Johansen approach, which offers a unified and multivariate setting to test for the presence of 
cointegration is used to analyze the interest rate data (Johansen, 1991). 
Let Yt be a 2x1 vector containing US and the Chinese (or US and Hong Kong) interest 
rate series. The Johansen test for cointegration is based on the sample canonical correlations 
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are estimated, where the  i C 's are constant vectors and the lag parameter p is chosen to eliminate 
serial correlation in the estimated residuals. The sample canonical correlations between ΔYt and 
Yt-p-1, adjusting for all intervening lags, are given by the eigenvalues,  2 1 λ λ > , of  12
1
11 21 Ω Ω Ω
−  
with respect to  22 Ω  where  ∑ ′ = Ω
−
t jt it ij T ε ε ˆ ˆ
1 , i, j = 1,2.    The trace and the maximum 
eigenvalue statistics are given by, respectively: 
 
∑ + = − − =
2
1 ) 1 ln(
r j j r T t λ    (4)   11
and 
) 1 ln( 1 1 + + − − = r r r T t λ , 0 ≤  r   ≤ 1. (5) 
The former statistic tests the hypothesis that there are at most r cointegrating vectors and the 
latter one tests the hypothesis of r against the alternative hypothesis of r+1 cointegrating vectors.   
The eigenvectors associated with  1 λ  and  2 λ are sample estimates of the cointegrating vectors.   
The cointegration test results are reported in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Cointegration Test Results 
 
1996:2 – 2006:4    1996:2 – 2000:6    2000:7 – 2006:4 
  EIGENV  TRACE   EIGENV  TRACE   EIGENV  TRACE 
A. China/US              
r=1 6.1668  6.1668  0.1763 0.1763  2.5143  2.5143
r=0  12.7248 18.8916  2.3018 2.4781  9.1555  11.6698
B. Hong Kong/US              
r=1 2.2839  2.2839  0.0437 0.0437  4.1058  4.1058
r=0 9.4839 11.7679  8.9298 8.9736  6.5875  10.6932
 
Note:   The results of testing for cointegration between the Chinese and the US and between the 
Hong Kong and the US interest rates are reported in Panel A and B. The first row lists the 
time periods covered by the full sample, the first subsample, and the second subsample. 
Eigenvalue and trace statistics are given under the columns “EIGENV” and “TRACE.” 
“r=0” corresponds to the null hypothesis of no cointegration and “r=1” corresponds to the 
hypothesis of one cointegration vector. The no-cointegration null is not rejected in all 
cases. The Cheung and Lai (1993) finite sample critical values are used. In all cases, the 
lag parameter used is selected using information criteria and the resulting Box-Ljung 
Q-statistics calculated from the first 5 and 10 estimated residual autocorrelations are not 
significant. 
 
  Quite surprising, there is very limited evidence of cointegration in these interest rate 
series. The null hypothesis is marginally rejected in only one case – the Chinese and the US 
interest rates in the full sample. For this case, the estimated cointegration vector is (1, 4.690)   12
with the Chinese coefficient being normalized to 1. The estimated vector implies that the two 
interest rates move in opposite directions in the long run; a result that is not consistent with the 
notion that the Chinese interest rate follows the US rate. Thus, we do not consider it an evidence 
of the dependence of the Chinese interest rate on the US rate. 
One possible explanation of the negative result is that the data are noisy and, thus, make 
it difficult to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. One way to improve the test 
performance is to impose the theoretical relationship on the data. Theoretically, under a fixed 
exchange rate arrangement, the dominating economy should dictate the common interest rate 
movement. In the current context, it means the interest rates in China and Hong Kong should 
equal the interest rates in the US, apart from, say, a risk premium. Assuming that the risk 
premium is stationary, the three interest rate series should move one to one in the long run. Thus, 
we impose the (1, -1) restriction and examine the stationarity of interest rate differentials 
between the US interest rates and the other two interest rate series. 
 
Table 3.  Stationarity of Interest Rate Differentials 
 
1996:2 – 2006:4    1996:2 – 2000:6    2000:7 – 2006:4 
 Constant  Constant  + 
Trend 
 Constant  Constant  + 
Trend 
 Constant  Constant  + 
Trend 
A. China-US                
ADF -2.002  -2.125    0.581  -2.152      -1.544  -0.577 
Lag 8  5   1  1   8  0 
B. Hong Kong-US                
ADF -1.801   -2.720    -3.637**  -1.137   -2.135  -2.418 
Lag 7  7   0  6   1  1 
Note:   The table reports results of applying the ADF tests to the interest rate differentials 
between China and the US, and between Hong Kong and the US in Panel A and Panel B. 
The first row lists the time periods covered by the full sample, the first subsample, and 
the second subsample. “ADF” gives the ADF test statistics. “LAG” gives the lag 
parameters used in the test procedures. “**” indicates the rejection of the unit root null 
hypothesis at the 10% level. In all cases, the Box-Ljung Q-statistics calculated from the 
first 5 and 10 estimated residual autocorrelations are not significant. 
   13
The results of testing for the stationarity of interest rate differentials are presented in 
Table 3. There is only one case in which there is evidence of a stationary interest rate differential 
series. The ADF test suggests that the Hong Kong and US interest rate differential is stationary 
between 1996 and 2000. 
In sum, there is only very weak evidence of long-run interest rate interactions between 
China and the US. There is a caveat: the validity of these results depends on whether the interest 
rate series are stationary or follow a unit root process. 
 
4.2 Vector  Autoregression 
In this subsection, we consider a few additional specifications for studying interest rate 
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ti t i t i YY μ ε − = Δ=+ Γ Δ + ∑ . (9) 
The three equations have different implicit assumptions about interest rate dynamics. Equations 
(7) and (8) implicitly assume the interest rate data are stationary around a constant and around a 
time trend, respectively. Equation (9) accounts for the case in which the data are difference 
stationary but are not cointegrated; see Shambaugh (2004). 
The Wald-type causality test based on exclusion restrictions under the VAR framework is 
employed to investigate interest rate interactions between the three economies. Four different 
null hypotheses are considered. They are a) the US interest rate does not cause the Chinese 
interest rate, b) the Chinese interest rate does not cause the US interest rate, c) the US interest 
rate does not cause the Hong Kong interest rate, d) the Hong Kong interest rate does not cause 
the US interest rate. Given the de facto exchange rate arrangements and the dominance of the US, 
one expects the test will reject the null hypotheses (a) and (c) but not (b) and (d).   
The causality test results are summarized in Table 4. For the China and US pair, the 
results vary across the three VAR specifications and sample periods. The evidence of the US 
interest rate affecting the Chinese interest rate, in general, is not strong. Instead, there are   14
non-negligible signs that the US interest rate is influenced by the Chinese interest rate – a result 
that is not expected from traditional considerations.
14 
 
Table 4.  Causality Test Results from Vector Autoregression Specifications 
  US does not 
cause China 
China does not 
cause US      US does not 
cause HK 
HK does not 
cause US   
     Lag       Lag 
A. 1996:2 – 2006:4      
 





(0.000)  7 
  24.781 
(0.002) 
7.026 





(0.000)  7 
  27.822 
(0.001) 
6.534 





(0.000)  5 
  6.773 
(0.010) 
6.118 
(0.410)  6 
B. 1996:2 – 2000:6      
 





(0.000)  2 
  0.262 
(0.609) 
0.214 





(0.000)  8   0.379 
(0.538) 
0.012 





(0.000)  1 
  0.279 
(0.597) 
0.245 
(0.621)  1 
C. 2000:7 – 2006:4      
 





(0.286)  2 
  13.327 
(0.001) 
4.702 





(0.856)  2 
  7.470 
(0.024) 
5.454 





(0.854)  1 
  9.180 
(0.002) 
3.343 
(0.068)  1 
Note:   The causality test statistics calculated from models (7), (8), and (9) are reported. The null 
hypotheses are listed in the first row. The lag parameters selected for the VAR models are 
given under column labeled “Lag.” Panels A, B, and C give results from the full sample, 
the first subsample and the second subsample, respectively. P-values are included in 
parentheses underneath the statistics.   
 
For the entire sample, the statistics strongly reject the hypothesis that the Chinese interest 
                                                 
14    While we do not necessarily subscribe to it, there is a view that the US interest rate is 
affected by China’s policy. For instance, consider the “revived Bretton Woods system” 
interpretation (Dooley et al., 2003; 2005). China maintains a low currency value to promote 
exports and, hence, economic growth. It invests its accumulated dollar surpluses in, say US 
treasuries and, keeps the US interest rate at a low level.   15
rate does not Granger cause the US interest rate in all the three VAR models – these statistics 
have a p-value less than 1%. The significant China effect seems contradictory to the conventional 
argument. On the other hand, the US effect on China is relatively weak – the hypothesis that the 
US interest rate does not cause the Chinese interest rate is only rejected at the 8.8% level under 
specification (7), at the 9.2% level under (8), and at the 11.2% level under (9). The most one can 
infer from these results is that the evidence points to feedback between the two interest rates but 
China’s effect on the US is more significant that the US effect on China. 
For the subsample 1996 to 2000, there is no evidence that the US influenced the Chinese 
interest rate. China, on the other hand, appears to have had a significant impact on the US 
interest rate under all the three specifications, with the statistics having p-values of less than 1%. 
The results for the 2000-2006 subsample are mostly insignificant. The only significant case is 
found under specification (7) in which the hypothesis of the US does not cause China’s interest 
rate is rejected at the 6.3% level. There is no evidence that China influenced US interest rates 
during this period. The results in the first and second subsamples are not consistent with the 
common belief that China is increasingly integrated with the global economy and its influence on 
the world is growing in the new millennium. 
The full sample results pertaining to the Hong Kong and US pair are largely in line with 
the US dominance story. The statistics underscore the US influence on the Hong Kong interest 
rate. In all the three VAR models, the hypothesis of the US interest rate does not cause the Hong 
Kong interest rate is soundly rejected. Hong Kong, on the other hand, is found not to affect the 
US interest rate. The result is in accordance with the conventional wisdom that the Hong Kong 
interest rate should follow the US one because it is a small open economy with capital mobility 
and is pegged its currency to a large US economy. 
The two subsamples, however, give a different picture on the causal relationship between 
the Hong Kong and the US interest rates. There is evidence of no causality in both directions in 
the first subsample that covers 1996 to 2000 – the US does not affect Hong Kong and vice versa. 
The effect of the US on Hong Kong interest rates shows up in the sample spanning 2000 to 2006. 
During that period, the hypothesis of the US does not cause Hong Kong interest rates is rejected 
at the 2.4% level or lower. Interestingly, Hong Kong is found to not affect the US at the 5% level 
but to affect the US at the 10% level. Thus, the Hong Kong effect is detected in the second 
subsample but not in the whole sample. Since the sample size is smaller in the second subsample,   16
the results are likely to be driven by some period-specific factors and not by the power argument. 
Overall, the China and US interest rate interactions revealed by the VAR results are not 
easily explained by conventional considerations. Specifically, the finding of the weak US effect 
on China and the significant China effect on the US is not in line with the argument that China 
loses its monetary policy independence under the de facto fixed exchange rate policy. 
The Hong Kong and US results, on the other hand, are a little bit more comforting. They 
point to the big economy effect on a small open economy Hong Kong. Nonetheless, it is still 
puzzling to observe the Hong Kong effect on the US. 
One observation is that, within each sample period, the causality results are relatively 
similar among the three VAR specifications, which encompass several assumptions of interest 
rate dynamics. Thus, the observed limited US effect on Chinese interest rates is not likely due to 
the model and the related assumed data dynamics.           
 
4.3  The PSS Bounds Test 
The validity of the inferences presented in the previous two subsections depends on the 
stationarity assumption – the data included in the model are assumed to have the same degree of 
integration. Recently, Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) propose a procedure to detect the 
dependence of one variable on the others that is robust to the stationarity assumption. We call the 
test the PSS bounds test. In the current context, the PSS bounds test for testing the dependence 
between Chinese and US interest rates is based on the following autoregressive distributed lag 
model of order (p,q): 
11
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where  , CN t Y  and  , US t Y   are, respectively, the Chinese and the US interest rates. Under the null 
hypothesis of  CN ϕ =  US ϕ   = 0, there is no relationship between the Chinese and US interest rates. 
As suggested by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001), we use a flexible dynamic specification and do 
not restrict changes in the Chinese and US interest rates to have the same lag structure. 
One important assumption underlying the test is that the Chinese level variable  , CN t Y  
does not cause the US level variable  , US t Y . Thus, the test implicitly imposes a conditional 
relationship between the two variables. It, however, does not preclude the possibility that 
changes in  , US t Y  ( , US t Y Δ ’s) are affected by changes in  , CN t Y ( , CN t Y Δ ’s). The assumption may   17
appear innocuous given the prominence of the US in both the international financial market and 
the global economy. To shed some light on the assumption, we will apply the PSS bounds test to 
an alternative specification later in this subsection. 
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) derive critical value bounds based on two sets of 
distribution functions to cover cases in which the right-hand-side variables in (10) are 
individually trend or individually difference stationary. Thus, the price for the robustness is the 
possibility of an inconclusive inference if the test statistic falls within the bounds.
15 For  the 
Hong Kong and US interest rates, their interactions are investigated with the Hong Kong data 
replacing the Chinese data in (10). 
 
Table 5.  Bounds Tests on the Dependence of the Chinese Interest Rates 
  2/1996 – 4/2006  2/1996 – 6/2000  7/2000 – 4/2006 
























2 − ΔCN   -0.184* 
(-2.049) 
-0.269 
(-1.768)  - 
5 − ΔCN   0.143 
(1.828)  - - 
6 − ΔCN   - -  -0.119 
(-1.727) 
12 − ΔCN   0.183* 
(2.301) 
0.460* 
(2.557)  - 
2 − ΔUS   -0.440 
(-1.970)  - - 
2 Adjusted R   0.395 0.425 0.144 
F-statistic 5.110  0.114  0.846 
 
                                                 
15  The exact critical value can be derived with information about the stationarity of the 
explanatory variables. The situation is similar to the use of Durbin-Watson statistic – the exact 
distribution of the statistic depends on information about the explanatory variables.   18
Note:   The PSS bounds test results with the change in the Chinese interest rate as the dependent 
variable are reported. The first row lists the time periods covered by the full sample, the 
first subsample, and the second subsample. The row labelled “F-statistic” gives the 
statistics for testing the hypothesis that both the coefficients of  1 − CN  and  1 US−   are zero 
(that is, the hypothesis of  CN ϕ = US ϕ = 0). The upper bound of the 5% critical value is 5.73 
for the three sample periods. 
 
The PSS bounds test results for the Chinese data are presented in Table 5. To facilitate 
discussion, estimates of (10) are also included. The lag parameters p and q are chosen to render 
insignificant serial correlation in the estimated residuals. Only significant lagged differences are 
reported for brevity. 
The F-statistics for the null hypothesis of  CN ϕ =  US ϕ   = 0 are listed in the last row of the 
Table. According to the critical values tabulated in Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) the bounds 
test statistics are not significant for the three samples under consideration. There is no evidence 
of the presence of a level relationship and the US impact on the Chinese interest rate. It is noted 
that the test results based on a less stringent assumption on data dynamics corroborate the 
cointegration results reported in the previous subsection. 
Despite the absence of a level relationship, estimates of (10) show that changes in the 
Chinese interest rates respond to variations in the US interest rates. The US effect is, however, 
only revealed in the full sample but not in the two subsamples. Further, changes in the US rates 
have an overall negative effect on the Chinese rates in the entire sample. The negativity result, 
again, does not lend strong support to the contention that China’s policy follows the US policy. 
The bounds test and the associated regression results for the Hong Kong specification are 
given in Table 6. The adjusted R-squares in Table 6 range from 70% to 47%, which are higher 
than the range of 43% to 14% reported in Table 5. Apparently, the autoregressive distributed lag 
(p,q) model (10) fits the Hong Kong data better than the Chinese data. It is interesting to note 
that, in both cases, the second subsample gives the lowest adjusted R-squares. 
  There are a few observations from Table 6. First, using the appropriate bounds test 
critical values, the F-statistic rejects the hypothesis of  HK ϕ = US ϕ = 0 in the full sample and the 
first subsample. Second, the  HK ϕ  and  US ϕ   estimates are similar in magnitudes but different in 
their signs during the full sample and the second subsample. Third, changes in the US interest 
rate have almost a one to one impact on changes in the Hong Kong interest rate in the full sample   19
and first subsample. Fourth, even the F-statistic does not reject the null hypothesis, the second to 
fourth observations hold for the second subsample. 
 
Table 6.  Bounds Tests on the Dependence of the Hong Kong Interest Rates 
 
Note:   The PSS bounds test results with the change in the Hong Kong interest rate as the 
dependent variable are reported. The first row lists the time periods covered by the full 
sample, the first subsample, and the second subsample. The row labelled “F-statistic” 
gives the statistics for testing the hypothesis that both the coefficients of  1 HK−  and  1 US−  
are zero (that is, the hypothesis of  HK ϕ = US ϕ = 0). The upper bound of the 5% critical 
value is 5.73 for the three sample periods. A significant 1997 financial crisis dummy 
variable is included in the full sample and first subsample.   
 
While the results are not uniformly confirmative, the observations listed above are 
indicative of the presence of the US effect and the dependence of the Hong Kong interest rate on 
the US rate. Further, in comparing results in Tables 5 and 6, we observe that the US effect on 
Hong Kong is more prominent than on China. 
Tables 7 and 8 give the bounds test and regression results pertaining to the specification 
  2/1996 – 4/2006  2/1996 – 6/2000  7/2000 – 4/2006 
Constant  -0.188 
(-1.874)  -  -0.110 
(-1.776) 












1 − ΔHK   0.128* 
(2.393) 
0.210* 
(2.282)  - 
2 − ΔHK   0.168* 
(3.065) 
0.231* 
(2.486)  - 
3 − ΔHK   -0.251* 
(-3.273)  - - 
11 − ΔHK   - -  -0.169* 
(-2.013) 






2 .R Adj   0.792 0.809 0.471 
F test  20.851  12.394  2.661   20
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where i = China and Hong Kong. Similar to the remark made for (10), if we apply the PSS 
bounds test to (11) to infer the level relationship between the US and, say, the Hong Kong 
interest rates, we implicitly assume that the US interest rate  , US t Y   does not cause the Hong Kong 
rate  , HK t Y . Knowing that this may not be a viable assumption, we do not literally interpret the 
statistics reported in the table but, rather, treat them as preliminary results that are indicative of 
interest rate interactions. 
 
Table 7.  Bounds Tests on the Dependence of the US Interest Rates (on the Chinese Rates) 
  2/1996 – 4/2006  2/1996 – 6/2000  7/2000 – 4/2006 
























2 − ΔUS   -  0.387* 
(3.267)  - 
3 − ΔUS   0.208* 
(2.500) 
0.413* 
(3.676)  - 




5 − ΔUS   -  0.322* 
(3.471)  - 






13 − ΔUS   -0.393* 
(-4.376)  - - 
2 Adjusted R   0.409 0.782 0.600 
F-statistic 1.216  7.676  7.481 
Note:   The PSS bounds test results with the change in the US interest rate as the dependent 
variable are reported. The first row lists the time periods covered by the full sample, the 
first subsample, and the second subsample. The row labelled “F-statistic” gives the 
statistics for testing the hypothesis that both the coefficients of  1 US−  and  1 − CN   are zero 
(that is, the hypothesis of  CN ϕ = US ϕ = 0). The upper bound of the 5% critical value is 5.73   21
for the three sample periods. 
 
Table 8.  Bounds Tests on the Dependence of the US Interest Rates (on the Hong Kong 
Rates) 
  2/1996 – 4/2006  2/1996 – 6/2000  7/2000 – 4/2006 
























3 − ΔUS   0.203* 
(2.465)  - - 
4 − ΔUS   - -  0.302* 
(3.223) 






13 − ΔUS   -0.392* 
(-4.336) 
-0.957* 
(-4.177)  - 
2 Adjusted R   0.408 0.722 0.598 
F-statistic 1.177  1.066  7.268 
Note:   The bounds test results with the change in the US interest rate as the dependent variable 
are reported. The first row lists the time periods covered by the full sample, the first 
subsample, and the second subsample. The row labelled “F-statistic” gives the statistics 
for testing the hypothesis that both the coefficients of  1 US−  and  1 HK−   are zero (that is, 
the hypothesis of  HK ϕ = US ϕ = 0). The upper bound of the 5% critical value is 5.73 for the 
three sample periods.   
 
One observation from both Tables 7 and 8 is that all the differences between the Chinese 
and Hong Kong interest rates are not significant and, thus, not reported. That is, the variations of 
the US interest rate respond neither to the Chinese nor Hong Kong interest rate changes. While 
two bounds test statistics in Table 7 and one statistic in Table 8 are significant, the lagged levels 
of the Chinese and Hong Kong rates;  ,1 CN t Y −  and  ,1 HK t Y − , do not appear significant. Even with 
the reservation about inference stated in the previous graph, the two tables offer some heuristic 
evidence that the US interest rate is independent of the Chinese or Hong Kong interest rate.   22
 
5. Discussion 
For an astute reader, the statistical evidence presented in the previous section just 
formalizes the inferences about interest rate interactions depicted in Figures 1 to 4. However, it is 
noted that the empirical evidence does not rule out the possible dependence of the Chinese policy 
on the US policy. Theoretically, the degree of interest rate pass through under a fixed exchange 
rate arrangement depends on, for example, the extent of capital control and the relevancy of the 
small economy assumption. China does not appear to meet the assumptions for perfect interest 
rate pass through. Our empirical evidence indicates China has alternative measures to de-link its 
interest rates from the US rate. 
The goal of China’s monetary policy is to “preserve the value of (its) currency and 
promote economic growth”.
16  Even before the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China has 
emphasized the importance of stability for economic growth. With its exchange rate effectively 
pegged to the US dollar, China has a number of policy measures to manage its domestic 
economy and to avoid significant economic turmoil. These measures include interest rate 
adjustment, reserve requirements, and open market operations. Recently, the Chinese authorities 
have been experimented with these policy options to manage its economy. There is evidence that 
China has increased the reign of market mechanisms. For instance, the changes in official 
interest rates and reserve requirements in 2005 and 2006 are widely interpreted as the evidence 
of an increasing role for these policy measures in macroeconomic management. 
Even with the increasing deployment of market mechanisms, capital control is the often 
cited administrative means that shields China from external financial disturbances. It is perceived 
that the de jure capital control is less effective than the de facto regulation. Nonetheless, the latter 
can be proved important at the time of crisis in managing capital flows. Last, but not the least, 
official guidelines and fiats are still important elements of the conduit of monetary policy despite 
the recent reduction of direct government intervention. Apparently, these policy and 
administrative measures help insulate China from the US monetary policy even under a de facto 
fixed rate arrangement. 
One indicator of China’s ability to manage its economy is its economic performance after 
1994, the year that the RMB adopted the de facto peg. In the post-1994 era – including the Asian 
                                                 
16   Dai  (2002).   23
financial crisis period – China has enjoyed relatively stable inflation and strong economic growth. 
Apparently, China is able to use various policy and administrative measures to keep its economy 
under control and avert major fiascos with the de facto peg in place. Nonetheless, it suggests 
neither that there is no (substantial) cost in maintaining the peg with the US dollar nor that macro 
management is free of troubles. 
The Chinese experience should be proved an interesting case study of migrating from a 
centrally planned economy to a market-driven economy. The emphasis on stability in general and 
on exchange rate stability in particular, offers a credible environment to implement the 
gradualism approach of economic reform. While the reform process has encountered difficulties 
of various natures, the overall result is very impressive. So far, the reform process leads to one of 
the most successful economic expansion stories in history. 
While the quest for a flexible RMB exchange rate policy may be of good intention, it 
implicitly assumes that China does not understand what is good for itself. From China’s point of 
view, the 1997 crisis and the recent 2006 Thailand financial market turmoil buttress the 
importance of stability for economic development. Against this backdrop, it is not difficult to 
comprehend the China’s policy of pursuing a measured program to liberalize its exchange rate 
policy and, at the same time, to strengthen its financial markets and re-tool its real sector.           
 
6. Concluding  Remarks 
In this exercise, we examine one argument put forth in the recent debate on China’s 
exchange rate policy. Specifically, we consider the assertion that a flexible RMB exchange rate is 
beneficial to China because exchange rate flexibility offers policy independence and allows 
China to pursue its own monetary policy to tackle domestic economic issues.   
We do not predict whether a flexible RMB exchange rate will enhance China’s policy 
autonomy. Instead, we investigate the degree of dependence under the existing de facto pegged 
exchange rate arrangement via interest rate pass through between the two economies. The 
interaction between the Hong Kong and US interest rates is used as a benchmark for comparison. 
In general, the empirical evidence of the US effect on the Chinese interest rate is quite weak 
while the US interest rate pass through is quite strong for Hong Kong. 
One feature of the current study is that interest rate interactions are examined under 
several possible scenarios. The general inference of weak US effects on Chinese interest rates is   24
drawn from models and techniques that allow for different assumptions of data persistence and 
from a few historical periods. In other words, the result is not driven by a specific choice of 
model specification. The robustness of the finding casts serious doubt on the relevance of the 
argument that the existing de facto fixed exchange rate arrangement ties China’s policy to the US 
policy. Even with the current de facto fixed exchange rate arrangement, there is no substantial 
evidence that the Chinese interest rate is driven by the US rate. 
Conceivably, there is antagonism towards the statistical evidence of the absence of 
China’s policy dependence. Our intention is not to divert the discussion of RMB policy to a pure 
statistical analysis. Instead, our objective is to provide a reasonably robust empirical evidence to 
facilitate the discussion of the presence or absence of policy dependence. Given the extant 
ambivalent theoretical and empirical results on the exchange rate regime effect on policy 
dependence and our findings of weak US effects on China’s interest rates, it seems prudential to 
be circumspect in asserting the benefit of policy independence from floating RMB. 
The point is, given the current economic reality, whether it is the right time for China to 
exit from the current exchange rate system that has worked quite well in the last decade. While 
we believe that a market determined RMB exchange rate offers considerable economic benefits 
including an efficient allocation of resources, our concern is whether the relatively 
underdeveloped Chinese financial markets can effectively handle the associated volatility and 
uncertainty. One practical view is to take full RMB convertibility a medium to long-term policy 
objective. Some commonly mentioned preconditions for the RMB to exit from the peg include 
reforms in the financial sector and in the setting of monetary and policies. It is also perceived 
that some obstacles to liberalize the exchange rate arrangement are the high level of 
non-performing loans in the banking industry, the lack of corporate governance, and rigidities in 
the labor market. In sum, there is substantial risk in liberalizing the RMB before China’s 
economy has established a sound financial sector and capital market and reduced impediments in 
the real sector. 
Given China’s increasing influence, a badly-timed and hasty exit from the pegged RMB 
policy may create adverse rippling effects in the international community. Undeniably, China 
faces some very complex problems. It is not our objective here to elaborate on various arguments 
for China to maintain the status quo of its exchange rate system. Instead, our exercise, at the risk 
of repeating ourselves, indicates that the argument for a flexible RMB to insulate China’s   25
monetary policy from the US effect is not substantiated by the observed interest rate interactions.   26
References 
Bergin, Paul R. and Òscar Jordà (2004), “Measuring monetary policy interdependence,” Journal 
of International Money and Finance, 23, 761–783. 
Borensztein, Eduardo, Jeromin Zettelmeyer, and Thomas Philippon (2001), “Monetary 
Independence in Emerging Markets: Does the Exchange Rate Regime Make a 
Difference?” IMF Working Paper WP/01/1.   
Calvo, Guillermo and Carmen Reinhart (2002), “Fear of Floating,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 117, 379-408.   
Cheung, Yin-Wong and Jude Yuen (2002), “Effects of U.S. inflation on Hong Kong and 
Singapore,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 30, 603-619. 
Cheung, Yin-Wong, Menzie D. Chinn, and Eiji Fujii (2005), “The Overvaluation of Renminbi 
Undervaluation,” manuscript, UCSC. 
Cheung, Yin-Wong and Kon S. Lai (1995), “Lag Order and Critical Values of the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller Test,” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 13, 277-280. 
Cheung, Yin-Wong and Kon S. Lai (1995), “Finite-Sample Sizes of Johansen's Likelihood Ratio 
Tests for Cointegration,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 55, 313-328. 
Chinn, Menzie and Jeffrey A. Frankel (1995) “Who Drives Real Interest Rates around the Pacific 
Rim: The US or Japan?” Journal of International Money and Finance, 14, 801-821. 
Corden, Max W. (1985), Inflation Exchange Rates and the World Economy, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Dai, Xianglong (2004), “China’s Monetary Policy in the Coming Years,” Speech given at the 
Bank of China Forum, March 16, 2002, Beijing. 
Devereux, Michael B. and Charles Engel (1999), “Fixed vs. Floating Exchange Rates: How Price 
Setting Affects the Optimal Choice of Exchange-Rate Regime.” National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper No. 6867, Cambridge: NBER. 
Dooley, Michael, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber (2003), “An Essay on the Revived 
Bretton Woods System,” NBER Working Paper No. 9971, Cambridge: NBER 
Dooley, Michael, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber (2005), International Financial 
Stability: Asia, Interest Rates, and the Dollar, Deutsche Bank Global Research. 
Eichengreen, Barry (2006), “China’s Exchange Rate Regime: The Long and Short of It,” 
manuscript, University of California Berkeley.   27
Evans, G.B.A. and Savin, N.E. (1984), “Testing for unit roots: 2,” Econometrica, 52, 1241-1269. 
Frankel, Jeffrey A. (1999), “No Single Currency Regime is Right for All Countries or at All 
Times.” NBER Working Paper No. 7338, Cambridge: NBER. 
Frankel, Jeffery A., Sergio L. Schmukler, and Luis Serven (2004), “Global Transmission of 
Interest Rates: Monetary Independence and Currency Regime,” Journal of International 
Money and Finance, 23, 701-734.   
Friedman, Milton (1953), “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates,” in Milton Friedman, eds., 
Essays in Positive Economics, pp. 157-203, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.     
Ghosh, Atish R., Anne-Marie Gulde, Jonathan D. Ostry, and Holger C. Wolf (1997), “Does the 
Nominal Exchange Rate Regime Matter?” NBER Working Paper No. 5874, Cambridge: 
NBER. 
Goldstein, Morris (2004), “Adjusting China’s Exchange Rate Policies,” manuscript, Institute for 
International Economcis. 
Goodfriend, Marvin and Eswar Prasad (2006), “A Framework for Independent Monetary Policy 
in China,” IMF Working Paper WP/06/11. 
Hausmann, Ricardo, MichaelGavin, Carmen Pages-Serra, and Ernesto Stein (1999), “Financial 
Turmoil and the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime,” Inter-American Development Bank, 
Research Department Working Paper No. 400. 
Hausmann, Ricardo, Ugo Panizza, and Ernesto Stein (2001), “Why Do Countries Float the Way 
They Float?” Journal of Development Economics, 66, 387-414. 
Imam, Michael (2004), “The Chinese Interbank Markets: Cornerstone of Financial 
Liberalization,” China & the World Economy, 12, 17-33. 
Johansen, Soren, (1991), “Estimation and hypothesis testing of cointegration vectors in Gaussian 
vector autoregressive models,” Econometrica, 59, 1551-1580. 
Li, Yang and Xianyun Peng (2002), “The Money Market In China: Theory and Practice,” China 
and & World Economy, 10, 3-10. 
McCallum, Bennett T. (2004), “China’s Exchange Rate and Monetary Policy,” Shadow Open 
Market Committee. 
McKinnon, Ronald I. (2005), “Exchange Rates, Wages, and International Adjustment: Japan and 
China versus the United States,” China & World Economy, 13, 11-27. 
McKinnon, Ronald I. (2006), “China’s New Exchange Rate Policy: Will china Follow Japan into   28
a Liquidity Trap?” The Economists’ Voice 3, Article 2. 
Mundell, Robert (2004), “China’s Exchange Rate: The Case for the Status Quo,” Paper presented 
at IMF seminar on “The Foreign Exchange System,” Dalian, China, May 26–27.   
Mussa, Michael L. (1979), “Macroeconomic Interdependence and the Exchange Rate Regime,”  
in Rudiger Dornbusch and Jeffrey Frenkel, eds., International Economic Policy: Theory 
and Evidence, pp. 160-199, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.     
Pesaran, M. Hashem, Yongcheol Shin, and Richard Smith (2001), “Bounds Testing Approaches to 
the Analysis of Level Relationships,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 16, 289–326. 
Quirk, Peter J. (1994), “Fixed or Floating Exchange Rate Regimes: Does it Matter for Inflation?”   
IMF Working Paper No. 94/134. 
Roberts, Ivan and Rod Tyers (2003), “China’s Exchange Rate Policy: The Case For Greater 
Flexibility,” Asian Economic Journal, 17, 155-184. 
Salant, Walter S. (1977), “International Transmission of Inflation.” in Lawrence B. Krause and 
Walter S. Salant, eds., Worldwide Inflation, pp. 167-232, Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution. 
Schwartz, Anna J. (2005), “Dealing With Exchange Rate Protectionism,” Cato Journal 25, 
97-106. 
Shambaugh, Jay C. (2004), “The Effect of Fixed Exchange Rates on Monetary Policy,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 301-352.     
West, Kenneth D. (1987), “A note on the power of least squares tests for a unit root,” Economics 
Letters, 24: 249-252. 
Williamson, John (2005), “The Choice of Exchange Rate Regime: The Relevance of 
International Experience to China’s Decision,” China & World Economy, 13, 17-33. 
Xie, Duo (2002), “Analysis of the development of China’s money market,” China & the World 
Economy, 10, 29-37. CESifo Working Paper Series 




1880 Peter Huber, Michael Pfaffermayr and Yvonne Wolfmayr, Are there Border Effects in 
the EU Wage Function?, December 2006 
 
1881 Harry Flam and Håkan Nordström, Euro Effects on the Intensive and Extensive Margins 
of Trade, December 2006 
 
1882 Panu Poutvaara and Mikael Priks, Hooliganism in the Shadow of the 9/11 Terrorist 
Attack and the Tsunami: Do Police Reduce Group Violence?, December 2006 
 
1883 Ruud A. de Mooij and Gaëtan Nicodème, Corporate Tax Policy, Entrepreneurship and 
Incorporation in the EU, December 2006 
 
1884 Johannes Becker and Clemens Fuest, Corporate Tax Policy and International Mergers 
and Acquisitions – Is the Tax Exemption System Superior?, January 2007 
 
1885 Momi Dahan and Udi Nisan, The Effect of Benefits Level on Take-up Rates: Evidence 
from a Natural Experiment, January 2007 
 
1886 José García-Solanes, Francisco I. Sancho-Portero and Fernando Torrejón-Flores, 
Beyond the Salassa-Samuelson Effect in some New Member States of the European 
Union, January 2007 
 
1887 Peter Egger, Wolfgang Eggert and Hannes Winner, Saving Taxes Through Foreign 
Plant Ownership, January 2007 
 
1888 Timothy J. Goodspeed and Andrew Haughwout, On the Optimal Design of Disaster 
Insurance in a Federation, January 2007 
 
1889 Wim Groot, Henriëtte Maassen van den Brink and Bernard van Praag, The 
Compensating Income Variation of Social Capital, January 2007 
 
1890 Bas Jacobs, Ruud A. de Mooij and Kees Folmer, Analyzing a Flat Income Tax in the 
Netherlands, January 2007 
 
1891 Hans Jarle Kind, Guttorm Schjelderup and Frank Stähler, Newspapers and Advertising: 
The Effects of Ad-Valorem Taxation under Duopoly, January 2007 
 
1892 Erkki Koskela and Rune Stenbacka, Equilibrium Unemployment with Outsourcing 
under Labour Market Imperfections, January 2007 
 
1893 Maarten Bosker, Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen, Herman de Jong and Marc 
Schramm, The Development of Cities in Italy 1300 – 1861, January 2007 
 
1894 Michel Beine, Oscar Bernal, Jean-Yves Gnabo and Christelle Lecourt, Intervention 
Policy of the BoJ: A Unified Approach, January 2007  
1895 Robert S. Chirinko and Daniel J. Wilson, State Investment Tax Incentives: A Zero-Sum 
Game?, January 2007 
 
1896 Theo S. Eicher and Oliver Roehn, Sources of the German Productivity Demise – 
Tracing the Effects of Industry-Level ICT Investment, January 2007 
 
1897 Helge Berger, Volker Nitsch and Tonny Lybek, Central Bank Boards around the World: 
Why does Membership Size Differ?, January 2007 
 
1898 Gabriel Felbermayr and Wilhelm Kohler, Does WTO Membership Make a Difference at 
the Extensive Margin of World Trade?, January 2007 
 
1899 Benno Torgler and Friedrich Schneider, The Impact of Tax Morale and Institutional 
Quality on the Shadow Economy, January 2007 
 
1900 Tomer Blumkin and Efraim Sadka, On the Desirability of Taxing Charitable 
Contributions, January 2007 
 
1901 Frederick van der Ploeg and Reinhilde Veugelers, Higher Education Reform and the 
Renewed Lisbon Strategy: Role of Member States and the European Commission, 
January 2007 
 
1902 John Lewis, Hitting and Hoping? Meeting the Exchange Rate and Inflation Criteria 
during a Period of Nominal Convergence, January 2007 
 
1903 Torben M. Andersen, The Scandinavian Model – Prospects and Challenges, January 
2007 
 
1904 Stephane Dees, Sean Holly, M. Hashem Pesaran and L. Vanessa Smith, Long Run 
Macroeconomic Relations in the Global Economy, January 2007 
 
1905 Richard Jong-A-Pin and Jakob De Haan, Political Regime Change, Economic Reform 
and Growth Accelerations, January 2007 
 
1906 Sascha O. Becker and Peter H. Egger, Endogenous Product versus Process Innovation 
and a Firm’s Propensity to Export, February 2007 
 
1907 Theo S. Eicher, Chris Papageorgiou and Oliver Roehn, Unraveling the Fortunates of the 
Fortunate: An Iterative Bayesian Model Averaging (IBMA) Approach, February 2007 
 
1908 Liliana E. Pezzin, Robert A. Pollak and Barbara S. Schone, Efficiency in Family 
Bargaining: Living Arrangements and Caregiving Decisions of Adult Children and 
Disabled Elderly Parents, February 2007 
 
1909 Christian Keuschnigg and Soren Bo Nielsen, Self-Selection and Advice in Venture 
Capital Finance, February 2007 
 
1910 Rune Jansen Hagen and Gaute Torsvik, Irreversible Investments, Dynamic 
Inconsistency and Policy Convergence, February 2007 
  
1911 Eric A. Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann, The Role of School Improvement in 
Economic Development, February 2007 
 
1912 Bernard M. S. van Praag, Perspectives from the Happiness Literature and the Role of 
New Instruments for Policy Analysis, February 2007 
 
1913 Volker Grossmann and Thomas M. Steger, Growth, Development, and Technological 
Change, February 2007 
 
1914 Margarita Katsimi and Thomas Moutos, Human Capital and the Feldstein-Horioka 
Puzzle, February 2007 
 
1915 Oliver Roehn, Theo S. Eicher and Thomas Strobel, The Ifo Industry Growth 
Accounting Database, February 2007 
 
1916 Ian Babetskii, Aggregate Wage Flexibility in Selected New EU Member States, 
February 2007 
 
1917 Burkhard Heer, Alfred Maussner and Paul D. McNelis, The Money-Age Distribution: 
Empirical Facts and Limited Monetary Models, February 2007 
 
1918 Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn and Eijii Fujii, The Overvaluation of Renminbi 
Undervaluation, February 2007 
 
1919 Jim Malley, Apostolis Philippopoulos and Ulrich Woitek, To React or Not? Fiscal 
Policy, Volatility and Welfare in the EU-3, February 2007 
 
1920 Mattias Polborn, Competing for Recognition through Public Good Provision, February 
2007 
 
1921 Lars P. Feld and Benno Torgler, Tax Morale after the Reunification of Germany: 
Results from a Quasi-Natural Experiment, February 2007 
 
1922 Robert S. Chirinko and Huntley Schaller, Fundamentals, Misvaluation, and Investment: 
The Real Story, February 2007 
 
1923 Benno Torgler and Friedrich Schneider, Shadow Economy, Tax Morale, Governance 
and Institutional Quality: A Panel Analysis, February 2007 
 
1924 Adrian Pagan and M. Hashem Pesaran, On Econometric Analysis of Structural Systems 
with Permanent and Transitory Shocks and Exogenous Variables, February 2007 
 
1925 Hans-Werner Sinn, The Welfare State and the Forces of Globalization, February 2007 
 
1926 Michael Smart, Raising Taxes through Equalization, February 2007 
 
1927 Øystein Foros, Kåre P. Hagen and Hans Jarle Kind, Price-Dependent Profit Sharing as 
an Escape from the Bertrand Paradox, February 2007 
 
  
1928 Balázs Égert, Kirsten Lommatzsch and Amina Lahrèche-Révil, Real Exchange Rates in 
Small Open OECD and Transition Economies: Comparing Apples with Oranges?, 
February 2007 
 
1929 Aleksander Berentsen and Cyril Monnet, Monetary Policy in a Channel System, 
February 2007 
 
1930 Wolfgang Ochel, The Free Movement of Inactive Citizens in the EU – A Challenge for 
the European Welfare State?, February 2007 
 
1931 James K. Hammitt and Nicolas Treich, Statistical vs. Identified Lives in Benefit-Cost 
Analysis, February 2007 
 
1932 Wilhelm Kohler, The Bazaar Effect, Unbundling of Comparative Advantage, and 
Migration, February 2007 
 
1933 Karsten Staehr, Fiscal Policies and Business Cycles in an Enlarged Euro Area, February 
2007 
 
1934 Michele Bernasconi and Paola Profeta, Redistribution or Education? The Political 
Economy of the Social Race, March 2007 
 
1935 Axel Dreher, Martin Gassebner and Lars-H. R. Siemers, Does Terror Threaten Human 
Rights? Evidence from Panel Data, March 2007 
 
1936 Naércio Aquino Menezes Filho and Marc-Andreas Muendler, Labor Reallocation in 
Response to Trade Reform, March 2007 
 
1937 Gebhard Flaig and Timo Wollmershaeuser, Does the Euro-zone Diverge? A Stress 
Indicator for Analyzing Trends and Cycles in Real GDP and Inflation, March 2007 
 
1938 Michael Funke and Michael Paetz, Environmental Policy Under Model Uncertainty: A 
Robust Optimal Control Approach, March 2007 
 
1939 Byeongchan Seong, Sung K. Ahn and Peter A. Zadrozny, Cointegration Analysis with 
Mixed-Frequency Data, March 2007 
 
1940 Monika Bütler and Michel André Maréchal, Framing Effects in Political Decision 
Making: Evidence from a Natural Voting Experiment, March 2007 
 
1941 Giacomo Corneo and Olivier Jeanne, A Theory of Tolerance, March 2007 
 
1942 Qing Hong and Michael Smart, In Praise of Tax Havens: International Tax Planning and 
Foreign Direct Investment, March 2007 
 
1943 Yin-Wong Cheung, Dickson Tam and Matthew S. Yiu, Does the Chinese Interest Rate 
Follow the US Interest Rate?, March 2007 